Military Intel Veterans on Why Process-Obsessed Military Culture Blocks Innovation

Two veteran intelligence officers with distinct naval and marine backgrounds reflect on how military intelligence operations have evolved from exclusive government programs to information-saturated environments where technology frequently fails to deliver. In this candid conversation on Defense Disrupted, Ed Padinske, Retired Navy Captain, who served as senior intelligence officer for Navy special warfare units, and Ed Sullivan, Retired Marine Colonel, who spent years as an intelligence officer in Iraq and later commanded an intelligence battalion, share battlefield perspectives on system failures. 

 

They explain to Ian how acquisition processes designed in the 1960s remain fundamentally unchanged while fighting modern adversaries, comparing it to racing a 1970 Nova in an F1 competition. Their frontline stories — from Padinske's experience in the White House Situation Room on 9/11 to Sullivan's cultural advisor role in Fallujah — illuminate how personality-driven procurement decisions often sabotage effective solutions, and why pushing capabilities to lower echelons could revolutionize warfare. Both agree that defense innovation requires not just technological advancement but a cultural shift from process compliance to mission outcomes.

 

Topics Discussed:

• How the proliferation of sensors and data sources has consistently outpaced analysis capabilities, creating environments where critical information exists but can't be effectively leveraged for battlefield decisions.
• The tension between forward-deployed personnel holding physical risk and rear-echelon analysts concerned primarily with policy risk, creating dysfunctional relationships and inefficient operations.
• How complex networks of stakeholders without decision-making authority create deliberate delays in the acquisition system, originally designed by McNamara in the 1960s to prevent surprising the Soviets.
• The stark contrast between veteran operators who struggle with digital interfaces and younger personnel who intuitively understand modern systems, illustrated through F-35 pilot debriefings where younger pilots outperformed veterans.
• How service members become accustomed to dysfunctional equipment and stop agitating for better solutions, exemplified by sophisticated systems left unused because of perceived network restrictions.
• Why the military acquisition system remains oriented around process compliance rather than mission outcomes, with many program officers simply trying to prevent their programs from being killed.
• How emerging technologies are enabling frontline personnel to create custom intelligence models for their specific tactical needs, potentially revolutionizing battlefield awareness and force protection.
• The opportunity to leverage Silicon Valley technology to create military advantage that translates into meaningful deterrence against peer adversaries, potentially preventing major conflicts.